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Abstract—
This paperpresentsa detailedstudyofBGP Multiple Ori-
gin AS (MOAS) conﬂicts observed in the Internet. A MOAS
conﬂict occurs when a particular preﬁx appears to originate
from more than one AS. We analyzed data from archived
BGP routing tables over 1279 days. Most of the conﬂicts
were short-lived, lasting only a small number of days. The
potential causes for the MOAS conﬂicts and impact on BGP
fault-tolerance are discussed in detail.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a detailed analysis of BGP[12]
routes that appear to originate from multiple Autonomous
Systems. The Internet is made of thousands of Au-
tonomous Systems, loosely deﬁned as a connected group
of one or more IP preﬁxes which have a single and clearly
deﬁned routing policy[11]. BGP[12] is the standard inter-
AS routing protocol. A BGP route lists a particular pre-
ﬁx (destination) and the path of ASes used to reach that
preﬁx. The last AS in an AS path should be the origin
of the BGP routes. A Multiple Origin Autonomous Sys-
tem (MOAS)conﬂict occurs if a preﬁx appears to originate
from more than one ASes. More precisely, suppose preﬁx
￿ is associated with AS paths
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In an effort to improve the fault-tolerance and secu-
rity properties of the BGP routing protocol, we have been
measuring the behavior of BGP. The MOAS conﬂicts are
interesting to us for a number of reasons. First, RFC
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1930[11] recommends that a preﬁx should originate from
a single AS, but MOAS conﬂict may occur for a limited
number of valid reasons. Second, MOAS conﬂicts could
be the result of a fault or an attack, where a BGP router
falsely originates routes to some other organization’s pre-
ﬁxes. We would like to understand the characteristics of
valid MOAS conﬂicts due to operational needs and invalid
MOAS conﬂicts caused by faults.
MOAS conﬂict data was obtained from Internet routers
and was analyzed based on the total number of conﬂicts,
duration of the conﬂicts, and the preﬁx length. Both the
number of MOAS conﬂicts and distribution of the dura-
tion of MOAS conﬂicts were different than what we antic-
ipated. This paper presents the measurement results and
analysis of potential causes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews the related work. Section III describes the
methodology we used to collect and process the data. Sec-
tion IV presents the MOAS conﬂict data. Section V and
VI provide detailed analysis of the results and our explana-
tions of the results. Section VII discusses the implications
of this work and summarizes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
MOAS conﬂicts have also been observed by other re-
searchers, but no one has considered the problem in de-
tail. The most relevant work comes from Geoff Huston’s
BGP Table Statistics website[9]. Starting on 2/18/2001,
this site began tracking a daily count of MOAS conﬂicts1
using data from some ISPs and from the Oregon Route
Views Server. On 04/19/2001, the website switched to
tracking MOAS conﬂicts on a bi-hourly instead of daily
basis. However, the BGP Table Statistics work provides
only a basic count of MOAS conﬂicts and no further ex-
planations or analysis is offered.
The MOASconﬂict issue has also been discussed within
the IETF. RFC 1930[11] recommends that a preﬁx should
belong to only one AS. If this recommendation was fol-
lowed, MOAS conﬂicts would not occur, with the possible
exception of a few unique cases discussed further in Sec-
tion VI-D. Berkowitz[13] discussed the potential causes of
￿Huston uses the term ”multiple-origin preﬁxes” in place of our term
”MOAS conﬂicts”MOAS conﬂicts. However, the discussion is not complete
and no implications of MOAS conﬂicts are analyzed.
III. METHODOLOGY
The BGP route for a preﬁx (destination) includes an AS
path. The last AS along the path to the preﬁx is considered
to be the origin AS. We examined the AS paths that led to
the same preﬁx but ended in different origin ASes.
We primarily used data from the Oregon Route Views
server [8] to obtain the BGP routes and AS paths used in
this study. Currently, the Oregon Route Views server peers
with 54 BGP routers in 43 different ASes. Each peer ex-
ports its BGP routing table to the Route Views server.
The Oregon Route Views data is particularly attractive
because it provides data from a number of different van-
tage points. The data obtained from a particular local
point, such as in an individual ISP, may show a smaller
number of MOAS conﬂicts since fewer potential AS paths
may be visible at that point in the network. For example, at
a randomly selected time, the Oregon Route Views server
observed 1364 MOAS conﬂicts, but three other individual
ISPs observed 30, 12, and 228 MOAS conﬂicts during the
same period. This only means that fewer MOAS conﬂicts
were visible to these ISPs and even the number of MOAS
conﬂicts observed from the Oregon Route Views Server
may underestimate the total number of MOAS conﬂicts.
To obtain a relatively complete view, we used archived
Oregon Route Views data from both NLANR[2] and
PCH.net [3]. NLANR archived the Oregon Route Views
data on a daily basis from 11/08/1998 to 03/16/2001.
PCH.net archived the Oregon Route Views data on a daily
basis from 03/16/2001 to the present. The MOASconﬂicts
are identiﬁed by preﬁxes only no matter whether a MOAS
conﬂict was conﬂicted by same set of origin ASes or the
conﬂict was continuous.
Notethat ASsets didnot play anymeaningful role inour
study. An AS path typically consists of the sequences of
ASnumbers used to reach preﬁx, but due to factors such as
aggregation, the AS path may also contain AS sets as well
as AS sequences. Out of of over 100K preﬁxes observed,
roughly 12 routes ended in AS sets and these 12 routes
were not included in the study.
IV. RESULTS
The total number and durations of MOAS conﬂicts de-
viated substantially from our expectation. Based on these
results, webelieve the nature of these conﬂicts differs from
what one might expect based on documents such as [11].
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Fig. 1. The number of MOAS conﬂicts from 11/1997to 07/200
Year Median of MOAS conﬂicts Increasing rate
1998 683
1999 810.5 18.7%
2000 951 17.3%
2001 1294 36.1%
Fig. 2. Median of MOAS conﬂicts per year
A. Total Number of MOAS Conﬂicts
Figure 1 shows the total number of conﬂicts from
11/08/1997 to 07/18/2001 2. Overall 38225 conﬂicts were
observed over 1279 days. The median number of MOAS
conﬂicts for each year are listed in Figure 2. There is an
increase from 683 conﬂicts in 1998 to 1294 conﬂicts in
2001.
B. Duration of MOAS Conﬂicts
Figure 3 shows the duration of MOAS conﬂicts, based
on the data (Figure 1). Figure 3 shows that most of the
conﬂicts are short-lived. 13730 out of 38225 conﬂicts ap-
peared only once and lasted less than one day. 11358 of
these one-time conﬂicts can be attributed to a conﬁgura-
tion fault that occurred on April 7th, 1998. Excluding the
one-time conﬂicts, the expectation of the duration is 30.9
days. Taking into account that many other short-lived con-
ﬂicts might also be due to faults, we considered the data
set which contains only conﬂicts whose duration is greater
than 9 days (a total of 10177 conﬂicts). For these con-
ﬂicts, the expectation of the duration is 107.5 days with
1002 conﬂicts lasted longer than 300 days. Figure 4 lists
the expectation of the duration from the different data sets.
The longest duration was 1246 days out of a possible 1279
days and 1326 conﬂicts were still ongoing as of the date
the paper was written.
The duration of an individual conﬂict counts the total
number days of the conﬂict was in existence, regardless of
￿The number of conﬂicts reached its peaks of 11842 on 04/07/1998
and 10226 on 04/06/2001.1
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Fig. 3. Duration of MOAS conﬂicts
Expectation (days) Measured data set
30.9 longer than 0 day
47.7 longer than 1 days
107.5 longer than 9 days
175.3 longer than 29 days
281.8 longer than 89 days
Fig. 4. Expectation of the duration of MOAS conﬂicts
whether the conﬂict was continuous and whether the same
ASes were involved.
The results seem a little surprising if one assumes that
multi-homing, discussed in Section VI-B, is the major rea-
son for the MOAS conﬂicts. Multi-homing would seem
to imply that the MOAS conﬂicts should last longer than
what is observed here and this is discussed further in Sec-
tion VI-F.
C. Distribution of MOAS Conﬂicts
Figure 5shows the distribution of conﬂicts among preﬁx
length. The /24 (netmask of 255.255.255.0) attracts most
of conﬂicts. This isnot unexpected since /24 preﬁxes make
up the bulk of the BGP routing table.
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V. CLASSIFICATION OF MOAS CONFLICTS
If a MOAS conﬂict occurs, preﬁx
￿ will be associated
with at least two different AS paths:
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￿ for a MOAS conﬂicts. In order
to better understand the type of conﬂicts and the potential
causes, we divided the MOAS conﬂicts into three classes
based on relationships between the two AS paths.
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In this case, there are two totally different routes for the
preﬁx
￿.
Instances of all three cases were observed and Figure
6 shows the number of conﬂicts for each class. In the
OrigTranAS class, an AS acts as both the origin AS and
a transit AS. In the SplitView class, a transit AS offers two
different paths to the preﬁx and these paths end in different
origin ASes.
The OrigTranAS and SplitView conﬂicts indicate that a
single AS may advertise multiple paths to the same pre-
ﬁx. This is often because of the trafﬁc engineering prac-
tices used at large ISPs. An AS might prefer that trafﬁc
to the same destination ﬂow through different paths due to
constraints such as geographical distances, link speed, or
economic reasons.
In the DistinctPaths class, there are two completely dis-
joint AS paths for the same preﬁx. Figure 6 shows that
the DistinctPaths class is dominant in the MOAS conﬂicts,
which is not unexpected because BGP only choose one
best route if no trafﬁc engineering practice.VI. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
There are a number of possible explanations for MOAS
conﬂicts. Unique cases such as exchange points, some
forms of multi-homing, and faults all contribute to the
MOAS conﬂicts. Each of these factors was observed in
this study.
A. Exchange Point Addresses
One potential cause of MOAS conﬂicts involves the
preﬁxes associated with exchange points (or equivalently,
links connecting ASes). A preﬁx associated with an ex-
change point is directly reachable from all the ASes at the
exchange point and each AS at the exchange point might
advertise the preﬁx as if it comes directly from that AS.
However, exchange point preﬁxes make up a small per-
centage of the MOAS conﬂicts observed in this study. In
the examined BGP data, 30 out of 38225 preﬁxes could
be deﬁnitively identiﬁed as exchange point preﬁxes. Our
analysis of exchange point preﬁxes may underestimate the
total number of exchange point preﬁxes, but the number
of exchange point preﬁxes remains relatively small even
if our estimate is off by two orders of magnitude. All of
these exchange point preﬁx conﬂicts lasted for long pe-
riods, consisting of most or all of the observation periods.
These MOASconﬂicts do not present a problem for packet
forwarding since each ASoriginating the route candirectly
reach the preﬁx.
B. Multi-homing Without BGP
In some cases, multi-homing can occur without the use
of BGP and this can result in MOAS conﬂicts. Suppose
there is a link between two ASes, but the routing across
this link does not use BGP (and instead relies on static
routing or some IGP). From a BGP perspective, it appears
as if one AS can directly reach preﬁxes belonging to the
other AS.
Again one would expect these conﬂicts to be long last-
ing since static routes are likely to have a long lifetime.
These MOAS conﬂicts could present a problem for packet
forwarding if the links necessary to support the static
routes fail.
C. Multi-homing with Private AS Numbers
To prevent AS number exhaustion, Haas [10] suggests
that a multi-homed customer uses a private AS number
which is mutually agreeable to all providers. This tech-
nique is called AS number Substitution on Egress (ASE).
If deployed, this approach could produce MOAS conﬂicts
because the private AS number should be stripped off by
the upstream providers and the real origin information will
be lost.
Based on discussions with network operators, we do not
believe this technique is used widely in practice. These
MOAS conﬂicts would not present a problem for packet
forwarding since all upstream providers can reach the pri-
vate AS. Furthermore, if the link to the private AS is lost,
the corresponding BGP route will also be withdrawn.
Because the links using non-BGP routing mechanisms
or private AS numbers are “hidden” to BGP, the pure BGP
data can not tell whether or not a MOAS conﬂict is due to
multi-homing without BGP or multi-homing with private
AS number. However, by contacting individual ASes, we
did conﬁrm such occurrences.
D. Theoretical Causes
Other factors have the potential to cause MOAS con-
ﬂicts, but these factors did not occur during our study. In
particular, RFC 1930[11] notes that aggregation could re-
sult in routes that end in AS sets. But overall, we typically
observed 12 preﬁxes which ended in AS sets and these AS
sets were consistent with each other.
Anycast address would also create MOAS conﬂicts
since an anycast preﬁx is intended to originate from mul-
tiple ASes. No preﬁxes in our study were identiﬁed as
anycast addresses.
E. Faulty or Malicious Conﬁgurations
MOAS conﬂicts can also occur when an AS incorrectly
originates routes to some other organization’s preﬁxes.
This could occur due to conﬁguration errors or even inten-
tional attacks. Often, the faulty ASdoes not have a route to
the incorrectly originated preﬁxes and packets that use the
incorrectly originated route will reach the faulty AS and
then be lost.
Figure 1 shows several notable examples of MOAScon-
ﬂicts caused by faults. The graph shows a large spike on
April 7th, 1998 and AS 8584 was involved in 11357 out of
11842 conﬂicts that occurred during that day. Discussions
on a network operators mailing list[4] indicated that AS
8584 falsely originated routes to those conﬂicted preﬁxes.
Consequently, some ASes selected the incorrectly origi-
nated route. Packets sent along this incorrectly originated
route would reach AS 8584 and would then be lost.
The graph also shows a large spike on April 10th, 2001
and the sequence (AS 3561, AS 15412) was involved in
5532 out of 6627 MOASconﬂicts that occurred during that
day. Based on the archived data from RIPE RIS [1], AS
15412 normally originates only 5 preﬁxes. However, on
April 6th, AS 15412 suddenly originated thousands pre-
ﬁxes due to a conﬁguration error[5].On April 25th, 1997, a severe Internet outage oc-
curred[7] when one ISP falsely de-aggregated most of
the Internet routing table and advertised the preﬁx e sa si f
they originated from the faulty ISP[6]. The falsely origi-
nated preﬁxes resulted in MOAS conﬂicts. These exam-
ples show that invalid MOAS conﬂicts do occur and can
have serious impacts on Internet routing.
Faulty aggregation could also cause MOASconﬂicts. In
faulty aggregation, an AS advertises an aggregated preﬁx,
even though some of more speciﬁc preﬁxes are not reach-
able by the AS. A MOAS conﬂict occurs if an aggregate
route is also generated by some other AS. Packets that use
the faulty aggregated route will travel to the faulty AS and
then may not be able to reach all the more speciﬁc preﬁxes.
F. MOAS Conﬂict Durations and Potential Causes
With the exception of faults and intentional attacks, the
possible explanations should have created long duration
MOAS conﬂicts. MOAS conﬂicts for exchange point pre-
ﬁxes should remain as long as two or more ASes choose
to advertise a route to the exchange point. The data con-
ﬁrmed this expected pattern and exchange point MOAS
conﬂicts persisted for most, if not all, of the study. Multi-
homing without BGP and multi-homing with Private AS
numbers both require router policy conﬁgurations at two
or more ASes and the resulting MOAS conﬂicts should
persist for as long as the multi-homing policy remains in
place. We expected that multi-homing policies (and the
resulting MOAS conﬂicts) would occur over months, not
days. But the data in Section IV shows a large number of
short duration conﬂicts.
One possible reason for short-lived MOAS conﬂicts is
that MOASconﬂicts could occur during a transition period
when a non-BGP customer switches from one provider to
another. To guarantee the connectivity to the non-BGP
customer, it is possible for both providers to originate the
customer’s preﬁx for a short period. Another possible and
more likely reason for short-lived MOASconﬂicts isrouter
mis-conﬁgurations or other faults. These conﬂicts disap-
pear when the faults are detected and corrected.
Overall, the duration can be a useful heuristic to dis-
tinguish between valid MOAS conﬂicts and invalid ones.
However, such differentiation can not be accurate enough
to be a solution to validate MOAS conﬂicts.
VII. SUMMARY
The MOAS data presented in this paper can help in un-
derstanding the operational behavior of BGP. At a mini-
mum, one would like to know if types of MOAS conﬂicts
expected to occur actually match the type of conﬂicts actu-
ally occurring in the Internet. These results would indicate
there are a large number of faults or large number of very
short lived multi-homing policies.
From the standpoint of fault-tolerance and security,
MOAS conﬂicts pose an interesting challenge. On the
one hand, MOAS conﬂicts can occur for valid reasons,
such as multi-homing without BGP and advertising routes
to exchange points. On the other hand, router mis-
conﬁgurations have also produced MOAS conﬂicts. Large
scale network outages and other problems have been as-
sociated with MOAS conﬂicts. When a MOAS conﬂict is
observed, we would like to be able to determine whether
it is the result of a fault or a valid change in routing/multi-
homing policy. Based on this MOAS data alone, we can
not accurately differentiate a fault from a valid policy
change, but we can utilize the MOAS analysis results as
a valuable input to address BGP problems and we are in-
vestigating techniques for identifying invalid conﬂicts with
a high degree of certainty.
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